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ABSTRACT 
Naval Forces Europe-Sixth Fleet (CNE-C6F) is responsible for the Gulf of 
Guinea (GOG) in Central-West Africa.  CNE-C6F’s goal is to provide persistent 
presence, pursuant the Global Fleet Station (GFS) concept, supporting U.S. Navy 
strategic priorities of Maritime Security and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC).  
Increased presence and developmental activities will assist host nations in developing 
their own maritime security.  Limitations on USN capacity and logistics support present a 
challenge to scheduling, sustaining, and allocating mission resources in the GOG.  This 
work presents an optimization model to aid in the mission planning and scheduling 
process.  Specifically, we use notional data from the GFS prototype developed by CNE-
C6F GOG Regional Planning Team which uses an LSD as the platform to accomplish 
almost 100 missions over six months.  The problem is constrained by a budget, re-supply 
needs, and transit times between countries, among other logistical requirements.  Our 
results show substantial improvements over current manual planning methods. For 
example, we demonstrate that 85% of the missions scheduled to be accomplished over 
the course of six months can be accomplished in three.  Significant savings are realized 
by using a High Speed Vessel or by relaxing the request to achieve the maximum TSC 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Naval Forces Europe-Sixth Fleet (CNE-C6F) is responsible for the Gulf of 
Guinea (GOG) in Central-West Africa.  CNE-C6F’s goal is to provide persistent 
presence, pursuant the Global Fleet Station (GFS) concept, supporting U.S. Navy (USN) 
strategic priorities of Maritime Security and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC).  
Increased presence and developmental activities will assist host nations in developing 
their own maritime security.  It will also improve efficiency and viability of future 
logistical requirements in support of the GFS Concept, Maritime Domain Awareness, and 
the Global Maritime Partnership Initiative.  The USN faces the challenge of weighing its 
resources against the value of a mission to TSC in Central-West Africa.  However, the 
GOG is unlike any other in which the USN currently operates and limitations on USN 
capacity and logistics support present a challenge to scheduling, sustaining, and 
allocating mission resources.   
This work presents the optimization model CARMA (Central-West Africa 
Resource and Mission Allocation) to aid in the mission planning and scheduling process.  
CARMA is designed to be a prototypic planning tool providing Fleet staffs the 
opportunity to examine the feasibility of future deployments and activities.  The CARMA 
model identifies how one naval ship with embarked Expeditionary Partnership Teams 
(EPT) (previously known as Expeditionary Training Teams) can best meet the logistical 
requirements to provide training and support to West African nations around the GOG.  
The study provides possible solutions in the form of a deployment schedule and the 
combination of EPTs required to perform the missions.  These results can guide planners 
in best utilizing current naval resources available in the region and provide insights for 
future planning.   
Specifically, we use notional data from the Fall 2007 GOG GFS Demonstration 
developed by CNE-C6F GOG Regional Planning Team.  This demonstration proposes a 
LSD (Landing Transport Dock Ship) as the platform to accomplish almost 100 missions 
over six months.  Among several logistical requirements, the problem is constrained by a 
 xviii
budget, re-supply needs, transit times between countries, and the necessity to accomplish 
a minimum level of engagement in each GOG country it visits.   
Our results show substantial improvements over current manual planning 
methods. Overall, we show that CARMA schedules missions resulting in increased TSC 
for the region with greater efficiency.  For example, we demonstrate that 85% of the 
possible TSC value from a six month scenario is accomplished by missions scheduled 
over the course three months.  Another scenario using a High Speed Vessel instead of a 
LSD renders a two-thirds reduction in cost.  Finally significant savings are realized by 
relaxing the request to achieve the maximum TSC value by 10%.   
CARMA can provide potential schedules and alternatives valuable to long-term 
planning in the GOG. Changing limitations on deployment time frame, ship or EPT 
availability, and budget offer opportunities to understand where tradeoffs can be made. 
CARMA can be used by planners to understand how different ship types may be used to 
accomplish similar missions.  Exploration into EPT constraints can help the USN to 
determine team requirements: CARMA optimally allocates training teams to a ship to 
achieve the maximum TSC value, while accounting for berthing availability and 
satisfying a variety of other ship- and scenario-specific constraints.   
   
 
1I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW 
Over the past few years, the United States Navy (USN) has increased its focus on 
the region of Central West Africa known as the Gulf of Guinea (GOG).  For several 
reasons, the nations surrounding the Gulf are becoming increasingly important and 
emerging as potential enduring partners.  The role of engaging many of these nations in 
Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) falls under the responsibility of Admiral H. G. 
Ulrich, Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe–Commander Sixth Fleet (CNE-C6F), the 
naval arm of U.S. European Command (EUCOM).  While the U.S. military has been 
involved in this region for many years, only recently have the USN’s coordinated and 
concerted efforts to improve maritime security and build partnerships become one of 
CNE-C6F’s top priorities.   
The USN has the challenge of weighing its resources against the value to TSC 
provided by missions accomplished in the GOG.  This area of responsibility is unlike any 
other in which the USN currently operates.  Severe logistical challenges exist, the most 
important of which are the lack of U.S.-owned bases within reasonable vicinity and 
limited local suppliers to provide dependable logistical support.  These challenges are 
exacerbated by ungoverned spaces and immature host nation navies with limited 
operational and logistical capacity, creating great complexity for planners assigning 
forces to missions in this region.   These missions include training maritime security 
forces in leadership, establishing communication and other infrastructures, developing 
security tactics and providing medical training, among others.  All of these activities are 
important to the success of the GOG region, but requests for assistance and equipment 
exceed USN’s capacity.  As an example, the USN cannot give other nations financial aid 
or equipment, as this is the State Department’s responsibility.   
Planners must wrestle with prioritizing host nation requests to best meet their 
needs and U.S. strategic goals.  Often these navies first need assistance with basic 
training and maintenance programs in order for other training programs to be beneficial 
in the long term.  Due to limited availability and high costs of logistics resupply assets of 
2the USN and of these developing nations, the Navy must be selective about the missions 
it conducts in order to provide the greatest benefit to the GOG nations and meet U.S. 
goals within the available budget.  This thesis develops a mathematical optimization 
model, Central-West Africa Resource and Mission Allocation (CARMA), to aid in the 
planning process. 
 
B. BACKGROUND  
 
1. The Importance of the Gulf of Guinea to the United States 
The GOG is an area of global concern for economic, political and military 
reasons.  It lies in the “Arc of Instability,” “...a swath of territory running from the 
Caribbean Basin through most of Africa, the Middle East, and Central and Southeast 
Asia. It is countries along this arc —often failed states— that U.S. officials argue have 
been left far behind as the rest of the world is brought into the global economy” [Military 
Reform Project 2003].  Piracy, drug and human trafficking, and fisheries poaching are 
just some of the everyday criminal threats which hinder economic advancement.  
Specifically for the U.S., the GOG is of economic concern because of the large amount of 
oil the U.S. imports from Africa.  It is believed that oil imports from GOG nations will 
rise to 20% by 2010, up from 15% in 2005 [Council on Foreign Relations 2006].   
 Political and military concerns arise from lack of maritime security and 
instability in the region and the desire to aid safety measures for partner nations and 
protect sea lines of communication.  Internal conflict spurred on by the struggle to control 
natural resources and power distribution has the potential to develop into cross-boarder 
crises in the GOG [Global Security 2006].  “A key mission for U.S. forces [in Africa] 
would be to ensure that Nigeria’s oil fields, which in the future could account for as much 
as 25% of all U.S. oil imports, are secure,” a senior Pentagon official told Greg Jaffe of 
the Wall Street Journal [Volman 2006].  The importance of the region is further 
supported by recent approval to create an additional combatant command for Africa.  
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that Africa Command will “oversee security, 
cooperation, building partnership capability, defense support to nonmilitary missions, and 
if directed, military operations on the African continent” [CNN 2007].  A dedicated 
3combatant command supports the idea that U.S. interests are protected through increased 
presence.   
 
2. USN Presence in the Gulf of Guinea 
The USN has the capacity and capability to provide increased presence and 
support the security efforts in Africa, specifically in the GOG, in accordance with its 
maritime strategy [Copp 2007].  However, USN efforts alone cannot accomplish this 
goal: coordination with the host nations is necessary.  One possible way to obtain security 
and stability is to train and support regional nations to provide for their own maritime 
security.  The Navy must help build their naval and maritime security forces with the 
correct capabilities and to appropriate capacity [Goldwyn and Morrison 2005, Miles 
2006].  Recent military guidance suggests and directs these actions.  The Department of 
Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition 
and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations orders the DOD to “develop greater means to 
help build other countries’ security capacity to ensure security in their own lands” [DOD 
2005].  Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Guidance for 2006 states the CNO’s vision for 
the future of the Navy includes “steadily deepening cooperation among the maritime 
forces of emerging partner nations” [CNO 2006].  
The idea of improving maritime security for GOG nations is clearly a high 
priority and is further defined by the President’s National Strategy for Maritime Security, 
EUCOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Guidance, U.S. Naval Forces Europe Guidance 
for 2006, and CNO Strategic Studies Group XXV Report.  Other concepts and initiatives 
which help to develop these capabilities and capacities are the Global Fleet Station 
(GFS), the Unclassified Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Initiative, and “The 1000 
Ship Navy” [Morgan and Martoglio 2005] (now known as the “Global Maritime 
Partnership (GMP) Initiative”).  Through these initiatives the Navy supports SSTR 
operations, builds partnerships, and promotes global maritime security.  There is evidence 
that host nations welcome international cooperation when it is inclusive and transparent.  
Increased naval presence in the GOG must also be persistent and non-threatening to the 
host nations.  This will require substantial logistics support, which is currently very 
limited [Ulrich 2006]. 
4Naval leadership believes USN presence and activities in the GOG can help build 
the capability and capacity of West African nations to ensure security for the region in 
the future.  Capacity building entails training military forces in order to improve their 
own security forces. This training ranges from small boat operations and force protection 
to vessel repair and ordnance disposal.  It also extends to non-military areas where 
governmental and non-governmental organizations provide medical and educational 
training.  The Navy can serve as an enabler for other services including reserves and U.S. 
Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. government (USG) organizations such as the State 
Department and U.S. Agency for International Development, and non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) or commercial entities by providing transport and hotel facilities, 
and security support.  However, there are few bases and ports for logistical support in the 
GOG that can support the deployment of U.S. forces for the training and assistance 
requested by host nations.  The closest U.S. owned bases that currently support Central-
West Africa are located in Rota, Spain and the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian 
Ocean.  Due to their great distances to the GOG, they are not practical for regional 
operations.1  
 
3. Gulf of Guinea Nations and Maritime Security  
CNE-C6F is responsible for most U.S. military affairs in Central-West Africa.  
They define the GOG as the following eleven countries (see Figure 1): Ghana, Togo, 
Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea (EG), Sao Tome & Principe (STP), 
Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa), and Angola [Mittleman 
2006].  Many of these countries’ naval forces are in a state of grave deterioration or 
virtually nonexistent.  Even the more advance navies carry out only coast guard-like 
missions including fisheries protection, counter-smuggling, and other law enforcement 
activities.  They are considered secondary to army forces and therefore receive little 
funding [Cobble et al. 2006].   
                                                 
1 Rota, Spain, is proposed to cover the West Africa region. The sailing path from Rota to Lagos, 
Nigeria, is about 3,500 nautical miles.  To put this in perspective, if we intended to cover Lagos from Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil, we would be over 150 miles closer. We might as well create the station in Norfolk, 
Virginia: the distance from Norfolk to Dakar, Senegal, is less than 3,400 nautical miles.  
 
5 
Figure 1.   Map of the Gulf of Guinea Region in Central West Africa [After Perry-
Casteneda 2006] 
 
By 2006, GOG countries made great strides to improve maritime safety and 
security in the region.  A first step was their participation in a EUCOM-sponsored 
workshop in Accra, Ghana in early 2006.  This set the stage for the “Communiqué of the 
Gulf of Guinea”.  This Communiqué or letter of intention was agreed upon in November 
2006 at the Maritime Safety and Security Conference in Cotonou, Benin.  The ministers 
and representatives of these nations agreed to improve MDA, implement legal and 
regulatory frameworks, sub-regional cooperation, and improve public awareness and 
political will to the benefit of maritime safety and security.  The GOG countries’ 
leadership urges greater collaboration to strengthen the relation with EUCOM and CNE-
C6F [Gulf of Guinea Maritime Safety and Security Ministerial Conference 2006].  The 
door is open for increased engagement. 
 
 
64. Persistent Presence and Logistical Challenges 
Persistent presence is a key concept to building partnerships and capacity.  A 
persistent presence allows familiarity through consistent interaction for both the USN and 
host nations.  Relationships develop between those people who work together on a 
regular basis.  The ability to routinely engage with partner navies, NGOs, and other 
organizations in the region is vital to the success of theater security and cooperation.  In 
the past the Navy has been a fair-weather partner and inconsistent in participating in 
GOG exercises on a regular basis.  Achieving the goal of persistent presence is dependent 
on logistics support from land or sea bases.  Current USN presence is adequately 
supported for a limited period of time, but extended deployments over several months 
prove problematic [Fulkerson 2006].   
Logistics support capabilities must be maximized to best meet the requirements of 
theater security cooperation and strategic regional goals for the nations in the GOG.  A 
limited amount of the logistical requirements of fuel, maintenance support, training 
support and subsistence can be met through a combination of local ports and naval assets.  
By choosing to engage in activities which best help to improve TSC given the limited 
available resources, time spent on station will be utilized to the greatest extent possible. 
As operations become more frequent and infrastructure improves, more logistical assets 
provide by host nations will increase the feasibility of staying on station for longer 
periods of time.  This increased time on station is believed to advance interoperability 
and relationships with the GOG nations.  Increased presence will open the doors for 
improving the efficiency and viability of future logistical requirements in support of the 
GFS Concept, MDA, and GMP. 
A possible sea base is the proposed GFS concept, which would link current naval 
bases around the world to local operations.  The GFS concept proposes a ship or group of 
ships that would provide training and classroom space, operational support, and logistical 
services to enhance TSC.  It would have onboard small training teams and units such as 
Riverine forces and helicopter detachments.  It would be “a persistent sea base of 
operations from which to coordinate and employ adaptive force packages within a 
regional area of interest,” and sustaining USN, DOD, and USG assets as well as other 
coalition partners in a region [Hilburn 2006].   Teams from GFS ships would include 
7Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), USCG, and NGOs to will provide 
training and support.  U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (NAVSO) is using Swift, a 
High Speed Vessel (HSV-2), for a GFS pilot program in the Caribbean.  However, in the 
Caribbean theater the distances are considerably less than in the GOG and there is 
sufficient shore-based logistical support.  While there will be lessons that the Navy can 
learn from NAVSO’s Caribbean demonstration, each region of the world in which the 
USN operates has different considerations and the same GFS platform is not the best 
solution for every region.  The USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43) will demonstrate GFS 
capabilities in the GOG during late 2007 [Fulkerson 2007-A].  If successful, this 
demonstration will continue to aid in the development of continual presence.  CARMA 
can be used to determine how a GFS platform can accomplish missions given current 
logistical support capabilities, which in turn can help prove the GFS concept. 
The U.S. does not have any military bases on the African mainland.  Instead, it 
relies on bilateral agreements with African countries to use their facilities [Volman 
2006].  Even so, there is no core logistics port or full commercial logistics capability in 
the GOG.  Additionally, USN combat logistics force (CLF) ships which usually provide 
sustainment for ships at sea are overextended with other commitments and cannot be 
guaranteed to be available in the region [Becker 2006].  At present, the U.S. is focusing 
on the GOG region to establish “bare-bones” facilities such as airstrips, basic 
communications links, and warehouses to be used for U.S. operations. Ghana and Gabon 
have signed agreements with the U.S. to allow American aircraft to refuel at local 
airbases [Volman 2006].  However, little analytical rigor has been used to determine the 
best way to achieve maximum mission accomplishment with the assets available while 
the specifications of a persistent sea base are being developed.    
CNE-C6F has a Regional Planning Team (RPT) for the Gulf of Guinea and is 
organizing efforts to develop activities that support U.S. regional campaign plans, as well 
as the Theater Security Cooperation strategy [Mittleman 2006].  This RPT will play a 
significant role in the coordination of maritime security efforts between the GOG nations 
and the U.S. military.  Despite the lack of military bases, the U.S. is involved with 
numerous countries for joint training exercises. Countries in the GOG region that have 
recently participated with the U.S. in exercises are Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria and 
8Cameroon. Exercises like West Africa Training Cruise and deployments by USS Emory 
S. Land (AS-39), USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44), and High Speed Vessel (HSV-2) Swift 
have provided opportunities for interoperability in the GOG.  However, while these ships 
may be deployed several months for these training exercises, they are only able to 
support operations for a few weeks in the GOG [Volman 2006].  As seen in Figure 2, the 
























U.S. Navy in Central-
West African ports
 
Figure 2.   Number of days U.S. ships have been in GOG ports [From CNE-C6F RPT 
2006] 
 
How the forces will be supported for maritime operations in the GOG for a long-
term basis needs to be decided.  In the near term, U.S. naval presence will be achieved 
through the aforementioned exercises and GFS demonstrations similar to previous 
deployments to the region.  Currently, some factors are hindering persistent training and 
presence by the Navy in the area, e.g.: (a) Minimal and expensive logistics support for 
resupply of food, fuel and support equipment; (b) lack of availability of dedicated and 
appropriate ship types that can support the training needed; (c) minimal maintenance and 
9training facilities; and, (d) environmental constraints such as overboard discharges and 
potable water, which impact the flexibility to extend time on station or the ability to pull 
into certain ports [Trott 2006].    
 
5. Current CNE-C6F RPT Planning  
Previous deployments to the region have had very short term planning horizons, 
despite the best efforts of CNE-C6F.  Many of the activities are a pick-up game of 
opportunity, where the underlying philosophy is “doing as much as can be done with 
short lead times and minimal resources” [Fulkerson 2006].  For example, the overall 
plans for the Emory S. Land’s 2006 deployment were changed several times.  The 
planning horizon was not sufficient to send in advance teams ahead of time to work with 
the host nations and determine their needs and coordinate with the defense attachés 
[Budney 2006].  Challenges in determining which missions could be accomplished due to 
funding issues were a large problem [Delaney 2007].   While the deployment was 
considered a success, more could have been accomplished.  
The CNE-C6F RPT staff is using a planning method called Effects-Based 
Thinking (EBT), a methodology that brings together strategic priorities and measures of 
effectiveness (MOE), such as number of personnel trained or status of equipment to 
determine mission success over time.  The latest deployments to the GOG have been 
planned using EBT [Ulrich 2006] as well as considering the requests of host nation 
countries.  This process is proving useful, but there are thousands of possible mission-
country combinations that the RPT planners do not have the time to consider.  There is 
room for mathematical models to assist in this planning.  Additionally, while much effort 
is being made to utilize EBT, MOEs are being developed in an area where there is little 
past experience of measuring and documenting the outcomes of engagements.  For 
example, the teams designated to conducting many of the security evolutions are part of 
the NECC.  NECC was created in 2006 and is still developing its concept of operations.  
As time progresses, more information will become available to help understand a 
complex environment where operations are not entirely familiar to the USN.  There are a 
large number of resources, schedules, and logistical issues to manage and CARMA can 
provide planners with an insight into what is possible.  
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C. GOAL  
This thesis uses the CARMA model to identify how one non-combatant type ship 
with embarked Expeditionary Partnership Teams (EPT) (previously known as 
Expeditionary Training Teams) can best meet the logistical requirements to provide 
training and support to West African nations around the GOG.  The study provides 
possible solutions to guide planners in best utilizing current naval resources available in 
the region and provide insights for future planning.   
Operations logistics techniques are used to model and optimize scheduling, 
sustainability, and other logistical problems. By identifying the constraints to mission 
accomplishment for U.S. naval assets while taking into account costs and benefits of 
these missions, mathematical models can be developed to help provide possible near-term 
solutions to resource allocation.  This work uses optimization models to help identify the 
best possible allocation of available naval resources to achieve maximum mission 
accomplishment in the GOG.  Specifically, CARMA maximizes the TSC value of all 
missions accomplished and then seeks a secondary goal based on minimizing cost.  This 
adheres to the policy of doing as much as possible with minimal resources.  The CARMA 
model is designed to demonstrate the capabilities of one USN ship and associated 
personnel to support increased engagement activity in the GOG.   
Specific guidance that CARMA provides includes which EPTs may be onboard, 
and how the ship can best move from one port to another in order to drop off EPTs or 
other personnel which can accomplish missions.  This is similar to the well-known 
“vehicle routing problem” (VRP).  The VRP entails designing the optimal set of routes 
for a fleet of vehicles in order to serve a given set of customers. The interest in VRP is 
motivated by its practical relevance as well as by its considerable difficulty [Toth and 
Vigo 2002].  While there are considerable similarities between the VRP and the GOG 
problem, the GOG problem has important features not typically part of a standard VRP.  
For example, CARMA allows for EPTs to be dropped off at a location and for the ship to 
return to pick them up upon mission completion.   
Work employing these techniques includes Naval Postgraduate School Master 
theses that have developed models contributing to USN aircraft carrier long-term 
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deployment scheduling [Ayik 2000] and U.S. Marine Corps Combat Service Support 
resource, asset, and network route optimization [Lenhardt 2001, Ozkan 2005].  However, 
no work has yet been done to model the logistical constraints of ship movement and 
mission assignment while considering the objective of maximizing mission value.  
Additionally CARMA embeds two optimizations: first a maximization of the TSC value, 
then a minimization of the total cost of all the missions to produce the best mission set 
and schedule at minimum cost.  
The initial measure of validity for the CARMA model is realized by comparing a 
number of test cases with past activities and current operational plans.  This work will 
have proved successful if it helps operational planners to better plan activities in the 
GOG.  CARMA should be used in conjunction with other judicious planning resources, 
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II. MODELING APPROACHES 
This chapter introduces the CARMA model which uses mathematical 
optimization to assign and schedule EPTs to missions that provide greatest value to TSC 
in Central-West African countries.  The model also minimizes total cost in order to return 
the best combination of these missions at the lowest cost.  
 
A. PROBLEM SPECIFICATIONS 
CARMA is designed to be a prototypic planning tool providing Fleet staffs the 
opportunity to examine the feasibility of future deployments and activities.  Its design 
allows changes in the majority of the data to reflect classified information and updates in 
resources and capabilities.   
 
1. Data 
a. Gulf of Guinea Countries 
The notional country network uses the physical location of the main port 
in which USN vessels have or plan to visit in each country.  Each country is assigned a 
number of candidate missions and a minimum TSC level.  Some countries are designated 
as being able to provide fuel and/or other provisions for the ship.  Two other ports in 
addition to the GOG countries are designated part of the data set, but do not have 
missions or TSC levels assigned to them.  These are Spain (Rota) and Senegal (Dakar).  
These countries provide re-supply opportunities for ships in transit to the GOG and are 
normal ports of call.  Finally, there is a fictitious country designated “At Sea”, which 
provides a location for the ship to conduct exercises at sea or an opportunity to conduct 
underway replenishment if a refueling asset is available.   
b. Missions 
The missions are a subset of those designated by CNE-C6F’s engagement 
plan to be carried out in between 2007 and 2016.  The missions are “discrete entities” and 
are paired with the countries where they can be executed.  (By discrete entity it is meant 
that if the same mission is requested more than once it is given its own specific notation.)  
Each mission can be accomplished a maximum number of times in each country.  Some 
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missions may have precedence relationships with respect to other missions, i.e., one must 
be carried out in order for the other to be considered. The missions are then further 
designated as those which require the ship to remain in port, those where the ship must be 
at sea, or where the location of the ship is unrestricted.  The ship must to drop EPTs off in 
order to complete missions and then later return for them upon completion of the 
missions. 
c. TSC Values 
Each mission is assigned a TSC value based on the benefit to theater 
security cooperation as determined by the Fleet staff.  Each mission accomplished counts 
towards satisfying the minimum TSC level for the country where the mission is 
performed and the overall goal for the region.  Often the exercises executed at sea involve 
a number of countries.  Therefore for exercises conducted at sea, the TSC values are 
awarded to the fictitious “At Sea” country increasing overall TSC value for the region.  
This interaction increases coordination and understanding among the navies and maritime 
security forces in the region which in theory should add to TSC for all GOG countries. 
d. Costs and Budget 
A cost ($ amount) is assigned to each mission.  The cost is determined by 
a cost per person-mission-day.  There is also a cost associated with each port per day with 
the exception of Rota, Spain and the fictitious “At Sea” port for which there is no 
additional cost.  The total cost of all missions performed and in port days cannot exceed 
the available budget.   
e. EPTs 
The EPTs are groups of people that can accomplish missions for which 
each EPT is capable.  They range in capabilities and numbers of people.  The EPTs can 
be organic to the ship or attached to the ship from another command, USG organization, 
or NGO.  The number of teams attached to the ship is limited only by available living 
accommodations for these personnel.  Additionally, the EPTs themselves are limited in 
availability by type.  For instance, there may be a limited number of civil affairs EPTs.  





The ship must be capable of carrying EPTs in addition to its regular crew.  
Ship specific data including available space for non-crew personnel, fuel capacity, and 
fuel consumption figures are used for each scenario.  Not included in the model is the 
need for or use of other organic transportation like helicopters or LCUs (land craft, 
utility).  A ship uses fuel at two rates, either underway or in port consumption.  The 
underway rate equates to consumption at the average transit speed.  The usage rate is 
calculated daily and is subtracted from the amount onboard at the end of the day.  Fuel 
consumption from other consumers such as LCACs (landing craft air cushioned) and 
helicopters can be considered. 
g. Distances 
Distances are measured in nautical miles from one port to another and the 
speed of transit is measured in knots.   
 
2. Assumptions 
The CARMA model makes several assumptions in order to be tractable, i.e., 
computationally solvable.  Like many naval missions, the number of people involved, the 
time to accomplish a mission and the resources consumed are not completely determined. 
These data figures are estimated averages and remain consistent: numbers of personnel 
on EPTs, length of mission, and fuel usage per day.  It is assumed that these assumptions 
will have little impact on the overall results of the model.  Planners then can use the 
results of the model to further define their schedule according to real-world specificities 
and other constraints not accounted for in the model.  
a.  Mission Support 
It is assumed that for each mission-country pair there is adequate support, 
transportation, and/or training facilities to conduct the mission. Additionally, it is 
assumed that EPT resources and physical requirements needed to conduct the missions, 
including storage space, communications, etc., can be met by the ship or host nation.  
EPTs will be self-sufficient while conducting their missions, i.e., the ship does not have 
to remain in port unless the mission is so-designated. 
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b. Fuel Usage 
One of the most important logistical constraints is fuel for the ship.  Fleet 
policy states that most ships need to maintain 60% fuel onboard.2  Many amphibious 
ships cannot physically have less than 50% fuel due to load instability problems.  Other 
ships such as the HSV can drop to 25% fuel capacity.  The model calculates fuel usage at 
an average speed which accounts for fluctuations in speed and fuel usage over a long 
period of time [Futcher 2006].  Ships can refuel at any of the designated refueling ports.  
The model requires one day at any refueling port (regardless of the amount refueled).  We 
assume the fuel from the country is satisfactory for all ships and all necessary transfer 
equipment is available. 
c. Provisions 
Current support for food and other provisions is usually between 25-30 
days.  While fresh fruit and vegetables are obtainable at several ports, not all provisions 
are available.  These other provisions must be flown in or received via CLF.  Both 
options are very expensive and there is a lack of CLF assets. Therefore, it may not be 
economically feasible to provide ships provisions in countries where they are not 
available and ships only receive provisions at designated ports. 
d. Movement 
CARMA allows for only one ship to accomplish all the missions.  When 
conducting missions not required to be done at sea or in port, the ship is free to move 
from one port to another as long as it returns to pick up the EPTs that it dropped off.  It is 
not realistic that a ship would get underway with no purpose.  Therefore, a small penalty 
has been assigned to each movement, which causes the model to move the ship only 
when it is going to refuel or accomplish a mission. 
e. Transit Time 
 The fidelity of the model only allows for distances to be measured in units 
of days, e.g., a 2.3-day trip would be conservatively inputted in CARMA as a 3-day trip. 
 
                                                 
2 Fleet Policy uses a “stop light chart” designation to assess fuel levels: 
 Above 80% = green 
 >70-80 = yellow 
 >60-70 = red  [Futcher F. (2006)] 
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3. Scope and Limitations 
The CARMA model can be used as both a strategic and operational planning tool.  
It is strategic because it provides an overall value for theater security and cooperation in 
the GOG region while achieving target values for individual countries.  It is operational 
because it assigns missions to a single ship over a specific time period.  It is not intended 
to be used as a final scheduling tool.  Instead, this tool should be used as a starting point 
for long-range planning.  There is a number of planning factors like availability of assets, 
time of year, environmental constraints, and sensitivities of particular countries that 
operational and logistics planners must consider and if necessary these other planning 
factors can be addressed in CARMA.    
 
B. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
This section describes the CARMA model, a two-objective integer linear 
programming model.  CARMA first seeks to maximize the value of all missions 
conducted.  It then minimizes the total cost (subject to an overall mission value target) of 
a set of missions with the same value. 
 
1. Sets and Indices  
U ,  EPT type, u U∈ . 
C , countries, c C∈ . We include a fictitious country 0c C∈  
representing a location “At Sea.” 
T , time period, {1,2,...,| |}t T T∈ = . Remark: we assume each time 
period represents one day. 
M ,  missions, m M∈ . 
J M U⊂ × , subset of mission-EPT pairs ( , )m u  where mission m is carried out 
by EPT type u. 
K M C⊂ × , subset of mission-country pairs ( , )m c  where mission m can be 
carried out in country c. 
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pM M⊂ , subset of missions in which the ship must remain in port for the 
duration of the mission. 
B M M⊂ × , subset of missions-mission pairs (m,m’) where mission m must be 
carried out before mission m’. 
sI M C⊂ × , subset of mission-country pairs (m,c) where mission m is carried 
out at sea and is of value to country c. 
fC C⊂ , subset of countries that can provide fuel. 
gC C⊂ , subset of countries that can provide food and water. 
 
2. Parameters (units) 
Uracks , number of people for which space onboard the ship is available for 
EPT personnel (persons). 
unp ,  number of personnel in EPT type u (persons). 
umaxN , maximum number of EPTs type u that are available (teams). 
md ,  duration of mission m (days). 
, 'c ctrip ,  duration of trip from country c to country c’ (days). 
tc ,  fuel tank capacity (gal). 
minFuel , minimum fuel level allowed (gal). 
initFuel , fuel onboard ship at the beginning of day 1 (gal). 
mb ,  fuel burn rate when transiting (gal/day). 
wb ,  fuel burn rate when in port (gal/day). 
resupplyT , maximum time between ship re-supply for food and water (days). 
cminEngage , minimum value required for all missions in country c (value units). 
maxMission , maximum number of each mission that can be conducted in each 
country. 
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mvalue , value earned for accomplishing mission m (value units). 
mcost ,  cost of mission m ($). 
cpCost , cost of going in port country c ($). 
budget , total amount of money allocated for all missions in the region ($). 
1penalty , penalty to discourage unnecessary movement for primary 
objective. Remark: For all examples, 1penalty  = 0.1. 
2penalty , penalty to discourage unnecessary movement for secondary 
objective. Remark: For all examples, 2penalty  = 100. 
TSC
∧
, TSC accomplishment (derived after the primary objective function 
has been optimized, see below) (value units). 
α , fraction of TSC∧ required to be accomplished when the secondary 
objective (cost) is optimized. 0 1α≤ ≤ . Note: 1α = unless 
otherwise specified. 
 
3. Decision Variables 
Binary Decision Variables 
. . .m c t uX , 1 if mission m in country c starts in day t by EPT u; 0 otherwise. 
,c tW ,  1 if the ship is waiting in port at country c in day t; 0 otherwise. 
, ',c c tQ ,  1 if the ships starts a trip from country c to country c’ in day t; 0 
otherwise. 
Non-negative Continuous Decision Variables (units) 
tF ,  amount of fuel onboard the ship at the end of day t (gal) 
tE ,  amount of fuel supplied to the ship at the beginning of day t (gal) 
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Non-negative Integer Decision Variables (units) 
uN ,  number of EPTs u onboard the ship (teams) 
 
4. Mathematical Formulation of CARMA Model 
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5.  Optimization Models 
Primary Model:    
Maximize (1) 
Subject to (3)-(21) 
Let , , ,
, , , |
( , )
( , )
m c t um
m c t u
m c K
m u J
TSC  = value X
∧ ∧
∈∈
∑ ,  
where , , ,m c t uX
∧
is the result of the primary model. 
Secondary Model   
Minimize (2) 
Subject to (3)-(20), (22) 
 
6.  Description of the Formulation 
The primary objective function (1) maximizes the total TSC value to the region 
from all missions accomplished with a penalty for non-necessary movement, subject to 
constraints (3)-(21).  In this first optimization, equation (21) ensures that the total cost of 
all missions conducted is within budget.  
The secondary objective function (2) minimizes the cost of all missions conducted 
in the region with a penalty for non-necessary movement.  This equation is subject to 
equations (3)-(20) and (22).  In the second optimization, budget is no longer a constraint. 
Instead, equation (22) is needed to ensure that the level of TSC value is a fraction 
(typically close to 100%) of that achieved after the first objective.  
Equations (3)-(7), and (17) allocate missions and EPTs.  Equation (3) ensures the 
value of missions conducted in each country satisfies the minimum engagement level for 
that country. Equation (4) provides for precedence between associated missions.  
Equation (5) allows for a maximum number of each mission to occur in each country 
while equation (6) restricts each EPT to accomplishing only one mission at a time.  
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Equation (7) limits the number of EPTs to available rack space onboard the ship, where 
the number of each EPT type available is restricted by (17). 
Equations (8)-(11) determine ship location: Equation (8) ensures the ship is either 
waiting in a country or underway at any time.  Equation (9) makes the ship wait in port 
throughout the duration of a mission that needs to be carried out in port at country c. 
Equation (10) ensures the ship is in port at the start of the mission to drop off an EPT 
doing a mission, while equation (11) requires that the ship is in port to pick up the EPT at 
completion of the mission.  
Equations (12)-(16) provide for replenishment.  Equation (12) ensures that the 
ship obtains provisions and other supplies within a specified time period at a port that can 
provide these commodities and equation (13) ensures that the port can provide fuel if 
needed.  Equation (14) keeps track of the fuel at time t through all that has been used and 
all taken on in refueling.  Equation (15) prevents the ship from offloading fuel while 
equation (16) prevents the ship fuel level from going below the minimum required tank 
capacity and from exceeding tank capacity.  
Equations (18)-(20) establish the domain for binary variables. 
 
C. IMPLEMENTATION 
The CARMA optimization model is implemented using a Mixed Integer Program 
(MIP) in GAMS [Brooke et al., 1996] and solved with GAMS/CPLEX [2006, GAMS 






































III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
In September, 2006, the Naval War College hosted a wargame for CNE-C6F to 
present their engagement plan for the GOG for 2007 through 2016.  The proposed plan 
includes a number of missions which would take place over the course of 2007 performed 
by USN, DOD, USG, and NGOs.  CNE-C6F has planned a six-month demonstration of 
GFS to accomplish these missions in Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, and 
STP.  This thesis adopts this plan and produces a routing schedule for how these missions 
might be accomplished by the Navy.    The following scenarios are built to demonstrate 
tradeoffs in total TSC value and cost due to a reduction of time, budget, and difference in 
ship types. Each subsequent scenario includes a ship, a set of possible missions to be 
conducted in each country, a number of training teams that can conduct those missions, 
and a time frame for the ship to make its deployment, among other data.  
The first goal is to show that all of the missions can be accomplished within the 
six-month window allocated for the 2007 GOG GFS Demonstration.  Secondly, it will be 
shown that EPT and mission assignment can be optimally scheduled.  We also show that 
given a shorten time frame, CARMA can schedule and allocate EPTs to achieve the 
missions with the best TSC value at the least cost.  Current operations in the region are 
slowly building in duration, but usually last for a couple months.  This thesis compares a 
base case with alternatives to provide insight into options that may be available for ship’s 
deployments.   
Changes made to the scenarios can include the number of missions, the number of 
countries, ship type, missions’ TSC values or cost, or the available budget.  The ship’s 
starting point can be at any country, including the fictitious “At Sea” node.  This node is 
centrally located at approximately one-day transit from the majority of the ports in the 
GOG.  In the data set used for the following scenarios, TSC values are determined 
through public information and are not fully indicative of USG intentions.  However, 
CNE-C6F has divided the GOG countries into three tiers based on a number of factors. 
These factors include accessibility of the country, democratic governance, the number of 
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USG and NGO programs and activities already in existence [Voelker McQuaid 2006], 
and prior involvement with USN.  The countries participating in the 2007 GOG GFS 
Demonstration considered to be in Tier 1 are Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, and STP.  Those 
in Tier 2 are Angola and Liberia.3  
The majority of the EPTs come from the NECC.  NECC is currently developing 
the concept of operations (CONOPS) for their different sub-commands.  These 
CONOPS, when complete, will provide further information on how their teams are 
organized and assigned to missions. Other teams used in the model are organic to the ship 
or come from the USCG, the Maritime Partnership Program, and military medical teams.  
One of the most significant challenges to operations in a region where there has 
been little previous experience is determining which ship can best achieve the assigned 
missions.  The ship must have sufficient capacity to accomplish the majority of missions, 
but also not have significant excess of capability which is underutilized and could be 
better used elsewhere.  Other characteristics must also be considered when determining 
which ship type to use.  For instance, many larger ships are constrained by draft in 
shallower waterways while other smaller ships have short underway sustainment times.  
Several types of ships have operated in the region and several have been considered as 
the prototype for a GFS.  These ship types include amphibious ships (LSD, LHD, and 
LPD), submarine tenders (AS), frigates (FFG), and high speed catamarans (HSV).  All 
have deployed to the region, engaging the host nation navies and successfully 
accomplishing missions.  The new littoral combat ship (LCS) has also been considered.  
For the scenarios in this thesis, the first choice is LSD, which has been designated by 
CNE-C6F as the GOG GFS Demonstration ship and will deploy in Fall 2007.  At the 
request of CNE-C6F’s RPT, the second ship modeled is HSV-2 Swift.  
 
 
                                                 
3 The GOG countries not included in the demonstration fall into the following categories: 
Tier 1: Nigeria 
Tier 2: Benin 
Tier3: Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa), Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), and Equatorial 
Guinea 
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1. The Solution Using Heuristic-CARMA 
Given the size of the CARMA model for deployment (underway time more than 
30 days) planning, we devise an approximating method that uses short-term time periods 
(typically months) and carries the information between consecutive periods.  The 
mathematical size of the CARMA model results in long run times and therefore requires 
the use of shorter time frame models, yielding an approximate solution to the original, 
six-month problem.  This procedure is called Heuristic-CARMA.   
In order to use Heuristic-CARMA with our baseline case, Scenario 1, the data is 
set up such that the LSD can conduct missions in only one country per month, in 
accordance with the pre-specified route: During the first time period the ship departs 
from Rota, Spain and completes missions in Liberia.  The next five time periods are 
dedicated to Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, Angola, and STP, respectively.  During the last 
time period, the ship completes its missions in STP and returns to Rota, Spain.   
In subsequent scenarios, the ship is allowed to conduct missions in several 
countries during a time period.  In addition, the ship conducts missions “At Sea” such as 
multinational exercises and embarking ship riders for training exercises.  These missions 
occur during several of the time periods in accordance with when the respective countries 
would be participating in an activity that must be done while the ship is underway.  
 
2. Bounding the Solution Using LR-CARMA 
Since Heuristic-CARMA produces a suboptimal solution to the original CARMA 
model (with all periods in a single problem), we also run a linear relaxation of CARMA 
(LR-CARMA) which yields a bound on the true optimal solution to the problem.  
For example, for Scenario 1, the LR-CARMA bound achieves the maximum TSC 
value of 369.  Thus, it is only informative to confirm that the maximum TSC value could 
be possible.  The LR-CARMA solution contains fractional values for some of the integer 
and/or binary variables, so we cannot tell whether this bound is achievable by a feasible 
solution without solving CARMA as a MIP or finding a heuristic solution that achieves 
that value.  However, in other scenarios the LR-CARMA bound may give a better 
estimate of solution quality for the Heuristic-CARMA solution. 
28
B. SCENARIO ONE: 2007 GOG GFS DEMONSTRATION 
 
1. Scenario Description 
CNE-C6F has scheduled a GOG GFS demonstration to commence in Fall 2007.  
A deployment similar to this is modeled in this scenario.  USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43) is 
designated as the GOG GFS platform and will depart from and return to Rota, Spain.  Its 
deployment includes scheduled logistics stop in Senegal, before continuing to the GOG 
for several months.  The route shown in Figure 3 shows the entire deployment.  The time 
frame for the 2007 GOG GFS Demonstration is six months, including transit time to and 
from the Mediterranean operating area.  The exact dates and activities of the deployment 
are yet to be decided.  Additionally, due to the sensitivity of some of the operations, the 
real-world schedule of some activities is classified.  Thus, the scenario will consider the 
activities that were planned by CNE-C6F for their 2006 unclassified wargame.  CARMA 
shows this route is sufficient and sustainable over a six month time frame given current 






















Proposed route for GFS in GOG
Sao Tome & Principe
UNCLASSIFIED
 
Figure 3.   Proposed 2007 GOG GFS Demonstration route [After Fulkerson 2007-B] 
 
The missions assigned to the countries are those designated by CNE-C6F (see 
Table 1).  Only the countries set to provide logistics support as shown in Figure 3 
(Senegal, Ghana, and Gabon) are designated to provide provisions, although USN has 
contracts in place to get fuel from other countries like Angola and STP if needed.   
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GOG Country Missions - 2007
ACTIVITIES GHANA GABON STP CAM ANGOLA LIBERIA AT SEA
MEDICAL 
MEDICAL OPS/READINESS SMEE X X
HA/DR OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES X
INFRASTRUCTURE
ENG RECONSTRUCTION SMEE, DIG WELLS X X X X X
RENOVATE MEDICAL CLINICS X X
RENOVATE SCHOOLS/YOUTH ORG FACILITIES X X
AIRPORT INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS X
ROAD IMPROVEMENTS X X X X
UTILITY IMPROVEMENTS X X X X
PORT INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS X
INFRASTRUCTURE GAP ANALYSIS X X X X
CIVIL/COMMUNITY AFFAIRS
PUBLIC AFFAIRS SMEE X X X X X X
BAND LESSONS X X X X
COMREL X X
SURFACE MARITIME ACTIVITIES
PORT SECURITY MTT X X
RIVERINE OPS SMEE
MULTINATIONAL EXERCISE X
SHIPRIDER EMBARKS X X X
SMALL BOAT / PATROL BOAT MAINTENANCE MTT X X
ISPS ASSIST/CERT VISIT X X X X
HYDRO SURVEY MTT X X
MINE CLEARANCE X
MILITARY & LEADERSHIP TRAINING
COMMUNICATIONS MTT X X X
OFFICER LEADERSHIP MTT X X
NCO PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT SMEE/MTT X
MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS ACTIVITIES
SHIP VISIT X X
MDA SITE SURVEY X
AIS RECIEVER SITES CONSTRUCTED X X X
COOPERATIVE SECURITY LOCATION X
GFS DEMO X X X X
LOGISTICS
LOGISTICS STOP
Tier 1 Tier 2
 
Table 1.   Missions assigned to GOG countries for the 2007 GFS Demonstration  
 
Table 2 shows mission attributes.  The ship’s location for each mission is either at 
sea, in port, or unconstrained.  Mission duration is based on previous deployments.  The 
number of personnel is reflective of the size of various EPTs predicted by NECC.  The 
costs of each mission are calculated from average mission costs at a per-person, per-day 




The available budget is set at $10 million, which will cover all the missions and 
two weeks of in-port days in each country.  The TSC values are estimated based on 
information on previous mission feedback and public information, but do not necessarily 
reflect actual CNE-C6F planning figures. 
  
GOG Country Missions - 2007
ACTIVITIES
MEDICAL 
MEDICAL OPS/READINESS SMEE 5 2 $5,000 3
HA/DR OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 3 5 $7,500 4
INFRASTRUCTURE
ENG RECONSTRUCTION SMEE, DIG WELLS 10 13 $65,000 5
RENOVATE MEDICAL CLINICS 3 7 $10,500 2
RENOVATE SCHOOLS/YOUTH ORG FACILITIES 3 7 $10,500 2
AIRPORT INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS 15 13 $97,500 6
ROAD IMPROVEMENTS 10 13 $65,000 4
UTILITY IMPROVEMENTS 10 13 $65,000 5
PORT INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS 20 13 $130,000 9
INFRASTRUCTURE GAP ANALYSIS 5 13 $32,500 5
CIVIL/COMMUNITY AFFAIRS
PUBLIC AFFAIRS SMEE 3 6 $9,000 5
BAND LESSONS 2 4 $4,000 1
COMREL in port 2 1 $1,000 3
SURFACE MARITIME ACTIVITIES
PORT SECURITY MTT 5 18 $45,000 8
RIVERINE OPS SMEE 20 40 $400,000 9
MULTINATIONAL EXERCISE "At Sea" 5 1 $2,500 10
SHIPRIDER EMBARKS in port 5 1 $2,500 7
SMALL BOAT / PATROL BOAT MAINTENANCE MTT "At Sea" 5 3 $7,500 6
ISPS ASSIST/CERT VISIT 10 4 $20,000 8
HYDRO SURVEY MTT 10 4 $20,000 8
MINE CLEARANCE 10 12 $60,000 7
MILITARY & LEADERSHIP TRAINING
COMMUNICATIONS MTT 5 4 $10,000 4
OFFICER LEADERSHIP MTT 5 3 $7,500 7
NCO PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT SMEE/MTT 3 1 $1,500 6
MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS ACTIVITIES
SHIP VISIT in port 5 1 $2,500 5
MDA SITE SURVEY 5 4 $10,000 7
AIS RECIEVER SITES CONSTRUCTED 10 13 $65,000 9
COOPERATIVE SECURITY LOCATION 5 4 $10,000 10
GFS DEMO "At Sea" 3 4 $6,000 7
LOGISTICS









cost ($) / 
mission
 




The port-cost, per-day data is an average of previous port costs for a number of 









STP $45,000 $10,000  
Table 3.   Average port-cost, per-day data for both LSD and HSV 
 
2. Results 
CARMA shows that six months are sufficient to carry out all of the activities 
assigned to each country.  The total TSC value of all 69 missions conducted is 369 at a 
cost of $8,368,500.  This provides an achievable target value from which to compare 
alternative scenarios.  
Tables 4 through 9 show notional schedules to achieve this solution by optimally 
scheduling resources to accomplish missions.  The tables show when the ship is in port, 
when it is underway, and when and which teams are assigned to missions.  Missions that 
are designated to be conducted at sea are inputted in the model as being conducted at the 
fictitious “At Sea” node.  As mentioned above, the scenario starts with the ship in Rota 
and conducts its first missions in Liberia as shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4.   Schedule of missions completed during days 1-28 in Liberia for Scenario 1: 2007 GOG GFS Demonstration 
 
The ship is forced to conduct a logistics stop in Senegal (see Table 4).  However, in order to achieve a greater number of 
missions accomplished, the ship drops off several EPTs in Liberia before heading back to Senegal.  This is not a conventional or 
necessarily practical schedule; however, it does allow for an important mission of improving port infrastructure to be accomplished. 
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Table 5.   Schedule of missions completed during days 29-52 in Ghana for Scenario 1: 2007 GOG GFS Demonstration 
 
The ship travels from Liberia to Ghana. Within 20 days it is able to accomplish all of its missions in Ghana.  Refueling only 






Table 6.   Schedule of missions completed during days 53-72 in Cameroon for Scenario 1: 2007 GOG GFS Demonstration 
 
Table 6 shows that all of Cameroon’s missions are completed in twelve days.  The “At Sea” mission where the ship rider 
embarks represents a mission where Cameroonian personnel would embark the GFS.  The timing of this event is not realistic, but the 
idea that there is sufficient time for the mission to be accomplished is represented.  Additionally, CARMA does not address the 








Table 8.   Schedule of missions completed during days 90-112 in Angola for Scenario 1: 2007 GOG GFS Demonstration 
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Tables 7 and 8 show that all missions in Gabon and Angola are accomplished.  This ship conducts a multinational exercise 
during days 92-96 that provides TSC benefit to all countries in the region.  The ship returns to Gabon on day 112 to refuel and 
resupply within the required 25 days as shown in Table 8. 
 
 
Table 9.   Schedule of missions completed during days 113-147 in STP for Scenario 1: 2007 GOG GFS Demonstration 
 
The ship completes its assigned missions in STP and returns to Rota as shown in Table 9.  The six months allotted for the GFS 
demonstration are sufficient to accomplish the missions; however, the total cost may be improved upon if the ship is able to spend 
fewer days in port.  The total time is 147 days.  Due to the fact that Heuristic-CARMA is used for this scenario, for each iterative time 
period the ship is forced to stay in port during the first time period at the country it ended in during the previous time period. This 
means that there are presumably five extra days in which the ship is waiting in port and no missions are being conducted. 
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Table 10 shows the EPTs that are used in the GOG GFS demonstration.  If all 
personnel remained onboard for the entire duration of the deployment, then the ship 
would have to provide additional berthing for 126 people (a LSD has sufficient berthing 
space).  However, this also shows that personnel from EPTs could embark and disembark 
the GFS in countries where other transportation to the GOG is possible and according to 




Days 1-28     # 
teams
Days 29-52   
# teams
Days 53-72   
# teams
Days 73-89   
# teams




Max # of 
personnel
SHIP 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2
USCG 4 1 1 1 1 1 4
NWC 25 1 25
EOD 12 1 12
NCF 13 3 4 4 3 4 52
MCAG 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
ETC 4 2 1 1 8
EXMED 5 1 1 5
RESERVE 4 1 1 1 2 8
MDA 4 1 1 4
51 110 71 58 20 80 126
Scenario 1
# EPT personnel onboard  
Table 10.   EPTs employed in Scenario 1: 2007 GOG GFS Demonstration 
 
Scenario 1 represents the most optimistic schedule in terms of time flexibility and 
mission accomplishment.  For comparison to other scenarios, it provides an upper bound 
on the total TSC value.   
 
C. SCENARIO TWO: 90-DAY GOG GFS DEMONSTRATION 
 
1. Scenario Description 
The same scenario as the GOG GFS demonstration described in Scenario 1 was 
run over a compressed timeline of 90 days.  The budget remains the same as at $10 
million.  While persistent presence is the goal, the reality of limited resources means that 
one option will be for a number of ships to make shorter deployments to the region.  
Also, extenuating circumstances that may require a ship to respond to another situation 
may mean that there is less time than originally planned for the deployment.  In this case 
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it is valuable to see what percentage of the total TSC value can be accomplished as well 
as how many of the original missions.   
 
2. Results 
Initial results show that, overall, 58 missions can be conducted in 90 days, almost 
half the time of Scenario 1.  This is a completion rate of 84% with respect to Scenario 1.  
The total TSC value returns a similar result: 82% of the maximum TSC value is achieved.  
Additionally, the cost is only 72% of the total for the six-month demonstration (see Table 
11).   
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
180-day demo 90-day demo
Missions Completed 69  (100%) 58  (84%)
TSC Value 369  (100%) 304  (82%)
Cost $8,268,500 $5,987,500  (72%)  
Table 11.   Results from the Scenario 2: 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration 
 
Remark: Since we use Heuristic-CARMA it is important to bound the best 
possible solution under the conditions of Scenario 2.  In this case, LR-CARMA yields a 
TSC value of 348, which indicates our heuristic solution is within 14% of optimality.   
Tables 12 through 14 show a notional schedule which allocates EPTs and 
schedules missions during 90 days (optimal within any 30-day period).
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Table 12.   Schedule of missions completed during days 1-33 in Ghana and Liberia for Scenario 2: 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration 
 
Table 12 shows that in 33 days, the ship is able to conduct the majority of the missions assigned to Liberia and Ghana.  Only 
five missions that are completed in the six month demonstration are not accomplished in this scenario.  Similar to Scenario 1, the ship 
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drops off EPTs at Liberia before heading to Senegal for its logistics stop.  Also, in order to minimize cost, the ship goes to sea rather 
than stay in port Ghana because there are no port costs for being “At Sea.”  
 
 
Table 13.   Schedule of missions completed during days 34-57 in Cameroon and Gabon for Scenario 2: 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration 
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During days 34-57 CARMA demonstrates how the GFS can drop EPTs off in one country then move to another to conduct 
missions before returning to the first country to pick up the teams it first dropped off (see Table 13).  Cameroon and Gabon are 
relatively close in distance and this schedule could also represent when helicopter or small boat transfer teams ashore.   
 
 
Table 14.   Schedule of missions completed during days 61-90 in Angola and STP for Scenario 2: 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration 
 
In the remaining 32 days, the ship conducts only one mission in Angola.  The tradeoff between conducting more missions in 
Angola and conducting more valuable missions “At Sea” is seen here (Table 14).  Greater TSC value is gained within the available 
time frame by conducting the missions “At Sea”.    
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Since fewer missions are conducted, fewer personnel and EPTs are needed than in 
Scenario 1, as shown in Table 15.  On average, more EPTs are employed at any one time 
meaning that it would be more practical for them to remain onboard for the duration of 










Max # of 
personnel
SHIP 1 2 2 3 3
USCG 4 1 2 1 8
NWC 25 1 25
EOD 12 0
NCF 13 4 4 4 52
MCAG 6 1 1 1 6
ETC 4 1 1 1 4
EXMED 5 2 1 10
RESERVE 4 2 1 2 8
MDA 4 1 1 4
115 76 86 120
Scenario 2
Personnel onboard  
Table 15.   EPTs employed 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration 
 
However, while there are six fewer people than in the Scenario 1, more 
missions are being conducted at any one time, therefore, there are tradeoffs in the 
composition of the EPTs used.  As shown in Table 16, EOD is not used in the 90-day 
scenario, but one additional USCG and EXMED team are now used.  
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
180-day demo  90-day demo
EPT type 
used
Max # of 
personnel













onboard 126 120  
Table 16.   Comparison of the number of EPTs needed to conduct missions in 180-day versus 
90-day GOG GFS Demonstration scenarios 
 
D. SCENARIO THREE:  90-DAY GOG GFS DEMONSTRATION WITH HSV 
 
1. Scenario Description 
U.S. Naval Forces South is using an HSV for its GFS demonstration in 2007.  
Since the HSV had been identified as a viable platform for GFS, CNE-C6F requested that 
it also be modeled.  The same mission data is used as Scenario 2 (the 90-day GOG GFS 
Demonstration) while the ship specific data such as fuel usage, fuel capacity, and 
berthing space for EPTs is changed to reflect the different characteristics of the HSV.  A 














in port fuel 
burn rate 
(gal/day)
LSD 454 804300 60% 12902 4173
HSV 107 138600 25% 8316 2772  






The most significant result of the HSV scenario is the reduction in cost of the 
GOG GFS demonstration.  This is mostly due to the lower average port costs of the HSV 
as compared to the LSD and is not a reflection of the missions themselves.  There are 
slight differences in the schedules, but both ship types achieve the same mission 
accomplishment rates and total TSC values in the 90-day time frame.  Table 18 shows the 
difference in cost between the LSD and HSV.  The most important conclusion is that 
using the HSV for the demonstration costs $2,339,500, almost 40% less than Scenario 2 
which uses an LSD.   
 
Scenario 2 Scenario 3
90-day with LSD 90-day with HSV
Missions Completed 58 58
TSC Value 304 304
Cost $5,987,500 $2,339,500  
Table 18.   Mission, TSC value, and cost comparison of 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration 
with LSD versus with HSV 
 
The LR-CARMA results for Scenario 3 are the same as for Scenario 2, finding a 
maximum TSC value of 348, which indicates our heuristic solution is within 14% of 
optimality. 
Tables 19 through 21 show the schedule for the HSV scenario. There are some 
slight differences from the Scenario 2 due to the fact that the HSV needs to refuel more 




Table 19.   Schedule of missions completed during days 1-33 in Ghana and Liberia for Scenario 3: 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration with 
HSV 
 
The HSV refuels and resupplies in Senegal on day 15 (see Table 19) as compared to day 12 where (see Table 12) we observe 









Table 21.   Schedule of missions completed during days 58-90 in Angola and STP for Scenario 3: 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration with 
HSV 
 
Tables 20 and 21 show Gabon as a major refueling port.  Similar to the LSD scenario, the model does not require the ship to 
refuel to its maximum level; therefore, the ship is shown refueling for three days.  In reality, the ship would require only one day 
refueling and the remaining days would be spent waiting in port for the EPTs to complete their missions.  
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Another distinction between the LSD and the HSV is the number of additional 
berthing spaces that are available for EPTs.  The HSV has only 107 excess spaces; 
therefore, because the LSD scenario required 120 personnel it would appear that the HSV 
would not be able to conduct all the missions the LSD could.  Instead, CARMA chooses 
a different EPT configuration which accomplishes the same TSC value.  The difference 
between the 95 EPT members on the HSV and the 122 on the LSD may provide 
additional savings (see Table 22).  This is important as it may not be obvious by manual 
inspection.  Table 23 shows which EPTs are used during each time period.  
 
 




Max # of 
personnel













onboard 120 95  












Max # of 
personnel
SHIP 1 2 2 3 3
USCG 4 1 2 2 8
NWC 25 0
EOD 12 0
NCF 13 4 4 4 52
MCAG 6 1 1 1 6
ETC 4 1 2 8
EXMED 5 2 1 10
RESERVE 4 1 1 1 4
MDA 4 1 1 4
86 80 82 95
Scenario 3
Personnel onboard  
Table 23.   Number of EPTs employed during each time period of Scenario 3: 90-day GOG 
GFS Demonstration with HSV 
 
The most obvious benefit of using an HSV is the cost savings. While the number 
of EPT personnel onboard remains well-below the maximum allowed, if more missions 
were added, berthing capacity on the HSV may become an issue.  Also, the HSV had to 
refuel much more frequently (approximately every 15 days as compared to every 30 days 
for the LSD); however, it is shown that this can be accommodated given the availability 
of refueling ports.   
 
E. SCENARIO FOUR: 90-DAY GOG GFS DEMONSTRATION WITH 75% 
BUDGET  
  
1. Scenario Description  
This scenario takes Scenario 2 (the 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration with an 
LSD) and reduces the budget for each time period by 25%.  For example, the budget used 
in Scenario 2 (after hierarchically maximizing TSC value and then minimizing cost) for 
days 1-33 was $2,142,000.  We constrain the available budget for the same time period in 
this scenario to 25% less, resulting in $1,606,500 being available.  This is done to see 
how tradeoffs are made between mission accomplishment and total TSC value when the 
budget is constrained. 
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2. Results 
The overall result is that the ship spends more time “At Sea” than in previous 
scenarios.  Fewer missions are completed, but the TSC value remains high.  As shown in 
Table 24, reducing the budget by 25% only reduces the total TSC value by 17%.   
 
Scenario 2 Scenario 4
100% budget 75% budget
Missions Completed 58 42
TSC Value 304 251
Cost $5,987,500 $4,475,500  
Table 24.   Mission, TSC value, and cost comparison of 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration 
and the same with 75% budget 
 
The solution using LR-CARMA provides an upper bound of 341 for the 
maximum TSC value, which indicates our heuristic solution is within 37% of optimality.  
It may be possible to develop a different heuristic model which based on previous 
scenarios can provide a better solution.  The scenario limits the budget to 75% for each 
time period.  However, different excursions into allocating the budget in different ways 
for each time period may provide a larger TSC value while still constraining the budget 
to 75%. 
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In comparison to the schedule for Scenario 1 shown in Table 12, Table 25 shows that the ship conducts missions at sea instead 
of in Liberia.  The missions “Shiprider Embarks” and the “GFS Demo” have a slightly lower TSC value (see Table 2), but come at a 
much lower cost, including port-cost savings.    
 
 
Table 25.   Schedule of missions completed during days 1-33 in Ghana and Liberia for Scenario 4: 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration with 
75% budget   
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While conducting missions in Gabon and Cameroon, the ship goes back and forth between the two countries dropping off and 
picking up EPTs instead of staying in port for the duration of the mission (see Table 26).  This increased underway time accounts for 
fewer total in port costs, but does not allow for enough time to conduct the missions at sea that are shown in the schedule of Scenario 
2 (Table 13).  
 
 
Table 26.   Schedule of missions completed during days 34-57 in Cameroon and Gabon for Scenario 4: 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration 
with 75% budget 
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Several of the missions in STP are expensive infrastructure improvement missions.  The ones that have a higher TSC value are 
conducted with the ship spending as little time as possible in STP.  The ship makes its necessary stop for provisions in Gabon before 
returning to Rota.    
 
 
Table 27.   Schedule of missions completed during days 58-90 in Angola and STP for Scenario 4: 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration with 




An interesting finding in this scenario is that more EPT personnel are used than in 
Scenario 2 (see Table 28).   One additional ETC team is used while the ship is completing 
missions in Cameroon and Gabon where the ship is going back and forth between the 
countries.   
 
 
Scenario 2 Scenario 4
100% budget 75% budget
EPT type 
used
Max # of 
personnel













onboard 124 120  
Table 28.   Number of EPTs used during each period of the 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration 
with 75% budget 
 
Scenario 4 shows an approximate optimal solution given constraints on the budget 
for each of the time periods in Scenario 2.  However, there may be a more optimal 
solution if instead the TSC value is constrained and the total budget can be allocated 
throughout the entire 90-day time period.  
 
 
F. SCENARIO FIVE: 90-DAY GOG GFS DEMONSTRATION WITH 90% 
TSC REQUIREMENT 
 
1. Scenario Description 
This fifth scenario explores the tradeoffs when a solution of at least 90% of the 
optimal TSC value optimal found in Scenario 2 is sought, while the cost is minimized.    
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2. Results 
The results of this scenario prove better than the results in Scenario 4.  When the 
budget was set at 75% of the original budget, the ship only accomplished 72% of the 
missions and achieved 83% of the total TSC value.  Scenario 5 shows that when the TSC 
value is forced to remain at 90% of the original, 84% of the missions are completed at 
only 73% of the budget (see Table 29).   
 
Scenario 2 Scenario 5
Max TSC 90% TSC
Missions Completed 58 49
TSC Value 304 275
Cost $5,987,500 $4,384,500  
Table 29.   Comparison between 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration and 90% TSC 
requirement scenario  
 




The main difference between the schedule in Scenario 2 and the similar time frame for Scenario 5 is that two missions at sea 
are accomplished in place of a number of missions in Liberia (see Table 12 and Table 30).  The ship conducts the same number of 
missions in Ghana, but five less in Liberia.  Overall, only one less EPT is needed. 
 
 
Table 30.   Schedule of missions completed during days 1-33 in Ghana and Liberia for Scenario 5: 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration with 
90% TSC requirement 
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The ship conducts the same number of missions at sea with one less mission in Gabon and three less in Cameroon.  However, 
the same number of EPTs is needed.  The ship also spends three more days at sea, reducing the overall cost (see Table 13 and 31).   
 
 
Table 31.   Schedule of missions completed during days 34-57 in Cameroon and Gabon for Scenario 5: 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration 
with 90% TSC requirement   
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Finally, the number of missions conducted “At Sea” and in Angola remain the same as in Scenario 2, with two fewer 
accomplished in STP.  There was little room to cut missions in this last time frame, and therefore the schedules are very similar (see 
Table 14 and 32).   
 
 
Table 32.   Schedule of missions completed during days 58-90 in Angola and STP for Scenario 5: 90-day GOG GFS Demonstration with 
90% TSC requirement 
 
Often a 90% solution is all that is needed or can be done.  CARMA shows that substantial cost savings can be realized if the 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
61
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis creates and implements the CARMA model which can be used to 
optimally schedule its resources to accomplish USN missions in the GOG.  CARMA 
takes into account logistical constraints and produces an optimal ship configuration and 
schedule for a given scenario.  This thesis demonstrates CARMA to optimally select and 
schedule missions to achieve the greatest TSC value, given a number of constraints 
including time, budget, and ship characteristics, among other logistical constraints. 
 First, CARMA is used to demonstrate that current planning is adequate to meet 
the mission requirements and scheduling.  Next CARMA is used to show how a majority 
of missions and TSC value can be achieved in a reduced time frame.  In the first case, all 
of the missions are conducted in 147 days.  Scenario 2 shows 82% of the original TSC 
value can be achieved despite a 40% reduction in time.  The third scenario shows the 
high cost savings of using an HSV instead of an LSD.  The cost is reduced by 60% due to 
port costs.  The fourth scenario shows that by cutting the budget 25%, there is only a 17% 
reduction in the total TSC value of the missions.  Finally, in Scenario 5, CARMA is used 
to show that there are alternative routes which can accomplish most of the possible TSC 
value at a fraction of the cost. 
CARMA can be used by planners to understand how different ship types may be 
used to accomplish similar missions given different constraints of each.  Exploration into 
EPTS constraints can help the USN determine numbers of teams that are required.  
Finally, CARMA can provide alternatives for long-term planning in the GOG.  
Follow-on research can be done to improve the heuristic through a Fix-and-Relax 
approach to the model and/or other decomposition techniques.  Other research can be 
done in conjunction with CNE-C6F and NECC to achieve greater fidelity in the data as 
well as comparing additional scenarios with the real world results of the actual 2007 
GOG GFS Demonstration.  This includes creating an Excel interface to provide for easier 
user accessibility and data recording.  Finally, additions to the model might include in-
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